The AWG also discussed whether or not there was some mechanism by which at least very promising projects could receive very modest pre-Phase A funding since even a Phase A proposal requires some $50-100K in development costs. The Advanced Mission Concepts effectively did this in a few cases about two years ago, although the purpose of that particular AO was in large part for strategic planning purposes. The AWG did not arrive at any consensus as to how this might be accomplished, and indeed there was the legitimate concern that this might just lead to yet another hurdle on the way to selection, and there was consensus that simply shifting the program to pre-Phase A would be make matters worse. Although there was no clear ground-swell of support, it was suggested that perhaps proposing institutions and companies might be allowed to recoup proposal costs for SUCCESSFUL proposals, although there may well be serious obstacles to doing this.
The consensus of the AWG (which is not unanimous) is that in the case of new data to be obtained with operating satellites, each satellite program ought to have its own DA money that it can distribute with observing time. Many members of the AWG are unhappy about the disappearance of such funds when a mission goes into its "extended phase", although (1) we are sensitive to the budget pressures and the need to turn these funds over to new missions if we expect reasonable launch rates in astrophysics, and (2) we recognize that missions that are in their "extended phase" are legible for additional funding through the Senior Review process. GO funds were first removed from an operating program in the case of IUE, and we remain distressed that NASA HQ apparently did not appreciate that this was intended as a one-year emergency measure precipitated by severe cost overruns elsewhere in the project.
We should also point out that as users of NASA facilities, we distinguish between mission operations on one hand and data analysis on the other. We applaud NASA's efforts to find more cost-effective modes of satellite operations. Data analysis funds, however, are used primarily to pay salaries of scientists and students who actually interpret the data and put them into an astrophysical context. Reducing investment in this part of the project simply reduces the science return. It is a false economy to to reduce or eliminate this expense, since this is where the total effort comes to fruition and yields the final product of the mission.
The AWG believes strongly that there must be some appropriate balance in the program between large and small missions. By some metrics, it can indeed be argued that the science return per dollar is highest for the most expensive missions, where the high-cost, high-return end of the distribution is firmly anchored by the Great Observatories, HST in particular; certainly the most expensive missions have very broad capabilities and can address fundamental questions in astrophysics. However, there is still a clear need for smaller, less expensive missions - these missions are pathfinders for later expensive missions, they are crucial in development of both space-flight hardware, software, operations, and observing techniques,and they provide the training ground for the next generation of instrument and detector builders. Therefore, as a basic principle, the AWG believes that any programmatic change that would REDUCE the number of launch opportunities, especially at the MIDEX and SMEX levels, would be detrimental to space astronomy; any further decrease in launch opportunities could plausibly lead to the loss of entire university-based space-hardware programs, which are already precious few.
There was discussion about whether the current budgets for the various programs are appropriate. The concerns here are actually multifold:
First, there is a question about whether the budget caps for the various classes are appropriate - can one do meaningful science within the budget envelopes of these various programs? The AWG seems very skeptical about the UNEX program in particular; several members expressed the sentiment that it is much too small to be scientifically useful. The AWG will be interested in studying the response to the upcoming SMEX AO in this regard. We also comment parenthetically that it must be kept in mind that minimal-cost missions might well prove to have different price tags in different wavelength regimes on account of different photon-detection efficiencies and the availability of photons in different wavebands.
Second, there is some concern about solicitation of missions of vastly different scope under the same AO. A legitimate concern is, for example, how can a $10M Spartan LITE compete scientifically with a $40M SMEX? Indeed, if the initial down-select is made purely on the basis of science capabilities, the smaller missions are less likely to succeed. The AWG recognizes that the situation is complex: on one hand, the large differences between the budget caps for various mission categories argues for finer gradations and more AOs; on the other hand, efficiency and economy push in the direction of fewer AOs. On balance, the AWG is generally supportive of fewer AOs IF some provision can be made for different mission-classes within the same AO that will ensure that less-expensive do not compete directly with more-expensive missions on a science-only basis. The AWG feels that it may be appropriate for us to assist OSS in drafting sample AO language that might protect smaller missions without undermining the primary goals of outstanding science and outstanding science per dollar. In order to preserve a balanced overall program, in general balloons, sounding rockets, and explorers serve very different purposes with the US space astronomy effort and these should not compete directly for the same funds.
Third, the issue of Missions of Opportunity was discussed, specifically with regard to whether or not SMEX or MIDEX opportunities should be used to leverage minority participation in large foreign missions. As noted earlier, larger, more capable missions are often deemed to produce greater science return per dollar, and thus a $70M MIDEX cannot be expected to compete with a large mission (say, $500M) on a science basis alone. The AWG concluded that $50-100M participation in large foreign missions would (1) violate the spirit of the Explorer program and probably congressional understanding of it, (2) generate difficult and probably divisive peer-review inequities, and (3) cause the Explorer program to evolve into a program that largely supports minority participation in foreign missions. This is not to say that minority participation in foreign missions is undesirable; certainly such participation was crucial in keeping the US X-ray astronomy community alive in the long dry spell prior to the launch of RXTE. We believe that the answer to this problem is to attempt to restore the "international projects" budget line rather than to attempt to do this at the expense of the Explorer program, which we regard as essential to the health of US space astronomy.
Finally, there was discussion of the issue of foreign participation in Explorer-class mission, specifically about whether or not foreign contributions ought to be counted against the mission cost cap. The argument for counting foreign participation against the cap has to do with the issue of fairness, i.e., again the theme that more expensive, more capable missions are scientifically the most interesting. The Missions of Opportunity issue is an extreme case. Some members felt that modest contributions by foreign entities (e.g., at say the 20% level) ought to be allowed and not counted against the cap. This issue remains unresolved.